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Abstract
This paper presents a novel analysis of two feed-in tariffs (FIT) under market and regulatory
uncertainty, namely a sliding premium with cap and floor and a minimum price guarantee.
Regulatory uncertainty is modeled with a Poisson process, whereby a jump event may reduce
the tariff before the signature of the contract. Using a semi-analytical real options frame-
work, we derive the project value, the optimal investment threshold, and the value of the
investment opportunity for these schemes. Taking into consideration the optimal investment
threshold, we also compare the two aforementioned FITs with the fixed-price FIT and the
fixed-premium FIT, which are policy schemes that have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature. Our results show that increasing the likelihood of a jump event lowers the investment
threshold for all the schemes; moreover, the investment threshold also decreases when the
tariff reduction increases. We also compare the four schemes in terms of the corresponding
optimal investment thresholds. For example, we find that the investment threshold of the
sliding premium is lower than the minimum price guarantee. This result suggests that the
first regime is a better policy than the latter because it accelerates the investment while
avoiding excessive earnings to producers.
Keywords: Investment analysis, Real Options, Feed-in Tariff, Regulatory Uncertainty
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1 Introduction
The quest for an optimal policy for incentivizing renewable energy production has led policy-
makers to create several support schemes over the past decades. Many jurisdictions use different
instruments to support renewable energy production, such as feed-in tariffs, quota obligations with
green-certificate trading, tenders, and tax exemptions. A key aim of these support schemes is to
accelerate the investment decision of renewable energy projects while making energy production
more sustainable (Couture & Gagnon 2010).
According to the Renewables 2019 Global Status Report (REN21 2019), 111 jurisdictions were
using feed-in tariff policies by the end of 2018, while 48 jurisdictions held auctions (i.e., tenders)
in 2018, and 33 jurisdictions were using quota obligations with green-certificate trading in 2018.
We can thus conclude that feed-in policies continue to play an important role in the policy-making
landscape of renewable energies.
∗Corresponding author:Cla´udia Nunes, cnunes@math.tecnico.ulisboa.pt
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Feed-in tariffs (FITs) are price-based schemes with long-term contracts, whereby an investor
receives a fixed or variable remuneration for a long period (e.g., 15 - 20 years). According to
Couture & Gagnon (2010), the feed-in policies can thus be classified into two groups. First, the
market-independent FITs are long-term contracts that pay remunerations that are not tied to
the energy market price. These feed-in policies are suited to support small scale projects or less-
mature technologies because they protect investors from price risk and thus reduce the cost of
capital. The second group is the market-dependent FITs or feed-in premiums, whereby investors
receive a fixed or variable premium over the energy market price. This category includes support
schemes such as a fixed premium, a minimum price guarantee and a sliding premium with cap
and floor1.
The European Commission (2013) sent out a recommendation for policymakers to shift from
the popular market-independent FITs to the feed-in premiums, because they believe that energy
market signals should be the key drivers of investment and production decisions. Feed-in premi-
ums can thus create incentives for producers to optimize investment decisions, plant design, and
production according to market signals.
This work uses the real options framework to present a novel analysis of two feed-in premiums,
namely a FIT with a minimum price guarantee (i.e., price-floor regime) and a FIT with a sliding
premium with cap and floor (i.e., collar regime). We also compare these two feed-in premiums
with two popular feed-in tariffs, namely a fixed price and fixed premium, that serve as baselines
for our analysis. The aim is to compare the key aspects of these support schemes that trigger a
renewable energy investment not only from an investor’s perspective but also from a policymaker’s
viewpoint. Netherlands (Agnolucci 2007), Ireland (Doherty & O’Malley 2011), and Switzerland
(Couture, Kreycik & Williams 2010) are examples of jurisdictions that have used variations of the
price-floor regime within a FIT contract. In addition, Spain (Barcelona 2012) is an example of a
jurisdiction that used the sliding premium with cap and floor.
Since its inception in 1978, policy revisions of FITs have occurred due to changing market
conditions and the need to meet specific goals of each jurisdiction. Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016)
state that policymakers adjust feed-in policies in order to accelerate renewable energy investments
and to find cost-effective policies that are subject to budget constraints. Hence, we also analyze
the impact of policy revisions on the optimal investment timing of feed-in premiums.
This work aims to shed some light on some challenging policy-making decisions. In particular,
we focus on the following research questions:
• How does a FIT with a minimum price guarantee and a FIT with a sliding premium with
cap and floor affect the timing of an investment decision, especially in comparison with
other feed-in policies that have been extensively studied in the literature?
• How does regulatory uncertainty impact the timing of an investment decision when policy-
makers may reduce the tariff of these two feed-in premiums?
Within the scientific literature, Kim & Lee (2012) also compare four different feed-in policies,
namely the fixed price, the fixed premium, the minimum price guarantee, and the sliding premium
with cap and floor. However, the work focuses on a different optimization problem, where the
authors optimize the tariffs in order to maximize the number of sign-ups. In contrast, our work
tackles a different optimization problem, where we consider a fixed tariff and derive the optimal
investment thresholds. In the same line of research, the paper from Chronopoulos, Hagspiel &
Fleten (2016) focuses on the same optimization problem as our work, where policy uncertainty
is also taken into consideration. However, the work only analyzes a fixed-premium FIT and not
the minimum price guarantee and the sliding premium with cap and floor. We thus build on
1The feed-in premium payments can be designed to be either a fixed predetermined amount over the market
price or sliding where the premium varies as a function of the market price.
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these previous research works to present a more complete analysis of FITs and how the optimal
investment timing can change under regulatory uncertainty.
Comparing our results with the work from Chronopoulos, Hagspiel & Fleten (2016), we also
find that investment accelerates when the fixed-premium FIT has a higher probability of retrac-
tion. In addition, we show that this results holds for the other feed-in policies, because investors
anticipate the decision in order to obtain a higher tariff. Our results also show that the risk of a
tariff reduction has a higher impact on the optimal investment timing of the fixed-price and the
fixed-premium regimes than the price-floor (i.e., minimum price guarantee) and the collar (i.e.,
sliding premium with cap and floor) regimes. We also present more results aimed at policy-making
decisions, when comparing the optimal investment thresholds of the FIT schemes. For instance,
the investment threshold of the sliding premium is lower than the threshold of the minimum
price guarantee. This result suggests that the sliding premium is a better policy than the mini-
mum price guarantee because the former policy scheme accelerates the investment while avoiding
excessive earnings2 to producers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review
and our main contributions to literature. In Section 3, we formalize the optimization problem
that this paper addresses, and Section 4 presents the model for the sliding premium with cap and
floor. In Section 5, we then present the models for the other FIT schemes, namely the minimum
price guarantee, the fixed price, and the fixed premium. Section 6 presents the analytical and
numerical study of the investment thresholds for all types of FIT design. Finally, we present the
concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Literature review
Myers (1977) was the first scholar to coin the term “real options” with an aim to create a methodol-
ogy to better value investment projects in the presence of managerial flexibilities. Tourinho (1979)
presented the first real options framework which analyzed the option to extract oil when future
prices are uncertain. A few years later, Brennan & Schwartz (1985) used the real options frame-
work to analyze mineral extraction investments. In addition, McDonald & Siegel (1986) derived
the optimal investment rule which takes into account the value of waiting. The authors show that
the standard net present value (NPV) analysis is grossly wrong.
Many managers in the corporate world rely on the NPV rule to analyze investment projects.
A project with a positive NPV is considered to have a profitable outcome. In contrast, a negative
NPV is considered to result in a net loss. However, the standard NPV valuation does not take
into account uncertainties and managerial flexibilities that are present in dynamic environments;
thus, it underestimates the value of the project. For example, the NPV method does not add
the value of several “options” (i.e., managerial flexibilities) that managers use in practice, such as
gathering information from the market and waiting to invest until market conditions are favorable.
Consequently, a project with a positive NPV may be optimally deferred, or a project with a
negative NPV may lead to a profitable outcome due to the added value of these options. For
instance, the case study from Rocha, Barbosa, Garcia, Sardinha & Teixeira (2007) shows how the
added value of these options can impact an investment project. The real options approach can
thus provide a good framework to value investment in the presence of uncertainties and managerial
flexibilities, such as renewable energy projects.
According to Cesen˜a, Mutale & Rivas-Da´valos (2013), the real options approach can be very
useful for the decision-making process of renewable energy investments. Renewable energy projects
are irreversible and present several uncertainties, such as market price uncertainty and regulatory
uncertainty. In addition, managers have several options in the decision-making process, such as
2Many works that have analyzed a FIT with a sliding premium with cap and floor state that this policy scheme
avoids excessive earnings to producers, such as the work from Cossent, Go´mez & Olmos (2011).
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the waiting option.
In fact, many scholars have used the real options approach to analyze renewable energy tech-
nologies in the scientific literature. For instance, Shao, Yang & Zhang (2017) proposed a frame-
work for policymakers that finds the optimal subsidies or optimal price discount rates to incentivize
the adoption of electric vehicles. Bonneuil & Boucekkine (2016) analyze the optimal moment for
adopting renewable energies and the optimal rate of adoption. Kowalski, Stagl, Madlener &
Omann (2009) use a participatory multi-criteria analysis to assess different renewable energy sce-
narios of technology deployment. However, these works do not analyze the feed-in tariffs as an
incentive to accelerate the investment decision of renewable energy projects.
Doherty & O’Malley (2011) use a real options approach to analyze the Irish REFIT program,
which is a variation of a FIT with a minimum price guarantee. With a Generalized Extreme Value
distribution, the authors forecast the mean expected market value of wind and the value of the put
option, given a strike price, in order to analyze the efficiency of the Irish FIT scheme in comparison
with the fixed-price FIT. The results show that the Irish FIT scheme creates a similar or lower
incentive than the fixed-price FIT for wind projects. Kim & Lee (2012) present an analysis of
four different FIT schemes, namely fixed price, fixed premium, minimum price guarantee, sliding
premium with cap and floor. In particular, the work uses a binomial lattice and simulation (i.e.,
real options numerical technique) to compare the four different FITs, whereby the work focuses
on how different scenarios (e.g., markets with different price volatilities) can impact the number of
sign-ups of renewable energy projects. The results suggest that the number of sign-ups increases
in more volatile markets, to the detriment of a higher cost for ratepayers. While these two research
works analyze FIT schemes from an efficiency viewpoint, they are based on a different optimization
problem. In particular, these works do not analyze the optimal investment thresholds and the
influence of regulatory uncertainty on the timing of the investment decision.
Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012) examine renewable energy investments under different pol-
icy schemes, namely a fixed-price FIT, a fixed-premium FIT, and a renewable energy certificate
trading scheme. With a semi-analytical framework, the authors derive the optimal investment
threshold and the optimal capacity to install. The work also assumes multiple sources of uncer-
tainty (e.g., steel spot price and subsidy payment) and uncertainty with respect to any change
of support scheme. The results show that fixed-price FITs create incentives for speeding up in-
vestment while the certificate trading generates larger projects. Following a similar approach,
Boomsma & Linnerud (2015) employ a semi-analytical real options framework to analyze policy
uncertainty for the same policy schemes in Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012). The policy uncer-
tainty considers that a scheme may be terminated at any point in time. The results show that pol-
icy uncertainty increases the investment threshold when the termination decision is retroactively
applied. In contrast, investment is accelerated when the decision is not retroactively applied. Our
work is significantly different from Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012) and Boomsma & Linnerud
(2015) because we derive two new support schemes, namely the minimum price guarantee and
sliding premium. In addition, our numerical study has novel results for policymakers regarding
the comparison of the optimal investment thresholds of four FIT schemes.
Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016) use a real options approach to analyze the effect of regulatory
uncertainty on investment behavior, where a policymaker may decide to switch from a fixed-price
FIT to a free-market regime (or the reverse case). The research work shows that regulatory
uncertainty delays the investment when the FIT tariff is close to the market price. If the FIT
tariff is significantly higher than the market price, then the regulatory uncertainty accelerates
investment behavior. With a semi-analytical real options framework, Chronopoulos, Hagspiel
& Fleten (2016) also analyze the same optimization problem as our work. The model includes
a fixed-premium FIT where investment may occur within a single stage or through multiple
stages. The work uses a Poisson process to model the policy uncertainty, whereby the FIT may
be introduced or retracted multiple times. The results show that investment accelerates when
the fixed-premium FIT has a higher probability of retraction, which is the same result in our
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work. However, we show that this result also holds to the other FIT schemes. In addition,
the authors find that a permanent subsidy retraction reduces the amount of capacity installed.
In summary, these two research works analyze a renewable energy investment under regulatory
uncertainty; however, our work has several differences. First, we analyze two new FITs, namely
a minimum price guarantee and a sliding premium, which are not included in the analysis of
these two papers. Second, we consider that a policymaker may reduce the tariff instead of a
regime-switching scenario of subsidies. Lastly, we present several policy-related results regarding
the optimal investment thresholds of the aforementioned feed-in premiums that are not discussed
in these two papers.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, our paper presents a novel analysis of the optimal
investment thresholds of finite-lived FITs with a minimum price guarantee and a sliding premium
under regulatory uncertainty, whereby a policymaker may reduce the tariff before the signature of
the contract. With a semi-analytical real options framework, we derive the value of the project,
the option value, and the optimal investment threshold of each FIT scheme. In addition, we
also compare these two FITs with a fixed-price FIT and fixed-premium FIT in order to draw
conclusions for both investors and policymakers.
3 Optimization problem
Throughout the paper, we assume that the energy market price changes stochastically over time,
under the risk-neutral measure. We denote it by P = {Pt, t > 0}, where P is the solution of the
following stochastic differential equation:
dPt = µPtdt+ σPtdWt (1)
with W = {Wt, t > 0} being a Brownian motion, µ the risk-neutral drift, and σ the volatility.
Note that we assume that energy market prices follow a geometric Brownian motion and this
can be considered a simplifying assumption. However, if we consider other dynamics - like a mean-
reverting process - the change in the qualitative results would be small, according to Schwartz
(1998). Moreover, as suggested by Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012), the drift µ can be estimated
from forward/futures prices.
We assume that before investment the firm has a zero payoff and that the investment cost is
I. We let r denote the interest rate under the risk-neutral measure. In order to avoid trivial or
ill-posed problems, we assume that µ < r. The optimization problem that we want to address is
the following:
FS(P ) = sup
τ
E
[∫ ∞
τ
piS(Pt)e
−rtdt− Ie−rτ |P0 = P
]
(2)
where piS denotes the profit function upon investment, that we assume to be of the following type:
piS(Pt) =
{
ΠS(Pt) τ 6 t 6 τ + T
PtQ t > τ + T
(3)
with τ being the time at which investment takes place, ΠS is the profit of the firm as long as the
subsidy is received, and T is the duration of the contract.
Throughout this paper, we consider four types of subsidy schemes, which lead to different
investment strategies of the firm. Therefore, we use the subscript S to denote the particular
subsidy that we are considering. The subsidies impact the profit function ΠS of the firm as we
will see. Furthermore, we assume that after the subsidy has been removed, the profit of the
firm depends solely on the market price and the quantity Q (total annual production), which we
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assume to be fixed over time. We note that similar assumptions have been used in Boomsma,
Meade & Fleten (2012) and Boomsma & Linnerud (2015), for instance.3
If the firm invests at time τ when the current energy market price is P , then it will receive
the following amount:
VS(P ) = E
[∫ τ+T
τ
ΠS(Pt)e
−rtdt+
∫ ∞
τ+T
PtQe
−rtdt|P0 = P
]
. (4)
Using (4) in (2), we conclude that the optimization problem that we propose to solve is the
following:
FS(P ) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ+T
τ
Πs(Pt)e
−rtdt+
∫ ∞
τ+T
PtQe
−rtdt− Ie−rτ |P0 = P
]
. (5)
The problem described in (5) is a standard investment problem, which can be solved using
the dynamic programming principle. We refer, for instance, to Dixit & Pindyck (1994), for the
main results about investment problems in a context of real options. Applying such results leads
to the following (general) solution of (5):
FS(P ) =
{
A1P
β1 0 < P < P ∗
VS(P )− I P > P ∗
(6)
with
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
((
−1
2
+
µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
) 1
2
> 1 (7)
and A1 and P
∗ being such that A1P ∗β1 = VS(P ∗)−I and β1A1P ∗β1−1 = V ′S(P ∗) (i.e., the so-called
value matching and smooth pasting conditions).
In the remainder of the paper, we let F denote the feed-in tariff and assume it to be fixed.
The four different types of feed-in tariff contracts that we consider in the paper are the following:
• Sliding premium with cap and floor, with ΠC(P ) := min (max(P, F ), C)Q; in this particular
case, the tariff F corresponds to the price floor, C is the price cap, and C > F .
• Minimum price guarantee, with ΠM(P ) := max(P, F )Q.
• Fixed-price scheme, for which ΠF (P ) := FQ.
• Fixed-premium scheme, for which ΠP (P ) := (P + F )Q.
Moreover, in this paper, we extend the framework to include policy uncertainty, whereby a
downward jump in the tariff F may occur according to a Poisson process. Note that the Poisson
process was also used in Boomsma & Linnerud (2015) and Chronopoulos, Hagspiel & Fleten
(2016) to model policy uncertainty4.
Let Y denote the time at which this change in the tariff occurs; in view of the assumption
of a Poisson process, Y follows an exponential random variable with parameter λ. We assume,
furthermore, that the price process in (1) and the time at which this tariff change occurs are
uncorrelated. Moreover, the tariff decreases by multiplying the tariff F with ω (i.e., the new tariff
is equal to ωF ), where 0 6 ω 6 1 .
3In their papers, the authors assume that the production is fixed, depending only on the capacity installed by
the firm. Although for short intervals of time, production of renewable energy sources vary with weather conditions,
for longer intervals the production is more stable.
4Alternative approaches, such as regime switching, have been used by Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012) and
Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016).
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In order to take into account the reduction of the tariff, we change slightly the notation, where
ΠS(P, F ) and piS(P, F ), for S ∈ {M,F, P}5, denote the profit flow under regime S when the tariff
received is equal to F . In addition, ΠS(P, ωF ) denotes the corresponding change in the profit
flow when there is a reduction of the subsidy, changing from F to ωF . In case of retraction of a
subsidy (i.e., the subsidy is totally abolished), ΠS(P, 0) denotes the change in the profit flow.
For the sliding premium case, we also use a similar notation as above. Since this subsidy has
a cap (C) and a floor (F ), we denote the profit flow by ΠC(P, F, C). Thus, ΠC(P, ωF, ωCC) is
the profit flow when the price floor is reduced to ωF and the price cap to ωCC.
We assume that once the firm invests, there will not be any change in the FIT contract (i.e.,
the tariff F does not change after the firm invests). Therefore, the optimization problem may be
written as follows:
FSR(P ) = sup
τ
E
[∫ τ+T
τ
e−rt
(
piS(Pt, ωF )1{Y <τ} + piS(Pt, F )1{Y >τ}
)
dt+
PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)(τ+T )
]
(8)
with 1{Y <τ} = 1 if Y < τ and 1{Y >τ} = 1 if Y > τ . We use the notation FSR in order to distinguish
the case of Regulatory uncertainty. Therefore, once the firm decides to undertake the investment,
we assume that there is no uncertainty about the tariff contract.
With these remarks, we proceed with the analysis of the problem. We need to consider two
cases:
i) The tariff has already decreased, thus the firm knows that the tariff is ωF during a period
T . Therefore, we denote F
(ω)
S (P ) as a value function equal to FS, as defined in (6), where
we substitute ωF for F .
ii) At the current time, the value of the tariff has not been subject to a decrease. In this case,
there is uncertainty about the evolution of the prices and the time at which the reduction
of the subsidy occurs (relevant only before the investment time). Thus, the corresponding
infinitesimal generator is now of the following form:
LSRFFR(P ) = µ P ∂FSR(P )
∂P
+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FSR(P )
∂P 2
+ λ[F
(ω)
S (P )− FSR(P )] (9)
where 1/λ denotes the expected time until the change in the policy occurs; see Øksendal &
Sulem (2005) for further details.
In (9), the term [F
(ω)
S (P ) − FSR(P )] accounts for the change in the value in case the tariff
decreases, which, in an infinitesimal interval, occurs with probability λdt. Note that this
term is precisely the major difference with the case where there is not regulatory uncertainty.
Moreover, for P in the continuation region (i.e, for values of P where investment is not yet
optimal), the value function is solution of the following equation:
µ P
∂FSR(P )
∂P
+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FSR(P )
∂P 2
− rFSR(P ) + λ[F (ω)S (P )− FSR(P )] = 0 (10)
Recall that F
(ω)
S (P ) is (6) substituting ωF for F . As ω is smaller than one, the investment
trigger with ωF is greater than the investment trigger with F , because if one does not invest
when the tariff is F , he will not invest when the tariff is ωF either. Therefore, the second
branch in (6) will never occur. And consequently, when the tariff is ωF , P is also in the
continuation region. F
(ω)
S (P ) is then equal to A
(ω)
1 P
β1 , and the value function before the
investment must be the solution of the following equation:
µ P
∂FSR(P )
∂P
+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FSR(P )
∂P 2
− rFSR(P ) + λ[A(ω)1 P β1 − FSR(P )] = 0 (11)
5M,F, P corresponds to minimum price guarantee, fixed price, and fixed premium respectively.
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In general, the solution of (11) is of the following form (Nunes & Pimentel 2017):
FSR(P ) = B1P
η1 + A
(ω)
1 P
β1 (12)
where η1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation:
0.5σ2η(η − 1) + µη − (r + λ) = 0. (13)
Hence,
η1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
((
−1
2
+
µ
σ2
)2
+
2(r + λ)
σ2
) 1
2
. (14)
Therefore, in case of regulatory uncertainty, the value function takes the following form:
FSR(P ) =
{
B1P
η1 + A
(ω)
1 PSR
β1 0 < P < P ∗SR
VS(P )− I P > P ∗SR
(15)
where P ∗SR denotes the investment threshold when the feed-in tariff used is S and under
regulatory uncertainty.
The constants A1 and A
(ω)
1 are found, in general, by fit conditions, so that FS and FSR are
continuous functions, with first order derivative for all possible values of P (see Øksendal & Sulem
(2005)).
Next, we derive the value function and the investment thresholds for the aforementioned FIT
schemes, without and with regulatory uncertainty, using the results of this section. The minimum
price guarantee is a special case of the sliding premium with cap and floor, when the cap C →∞.
Moreover, the fixed price is also special case of the sliding premium, when the value of the cap
is equal to the value of the floor (i.e., C = F ). For this reason, as we will see in the following
sections, we derive first the results for the sliding premium with cap and floor, and then use these
results to derive the other two regimes.
4 Sliding premium with cap and floor FIT
In this section, we derive the value function and the investment trigger for the sliding premium
with cap and floor, also known as a collar regime. A collar regime has the following remuneration
conditions: (i) the producer receives a price floor F when the market price is below the price
floor, (ii) the producer receives a price cap C, where C > F , when the market price is above the
price cap, and (iii) the producer sells energy for the electricity market price P when the market
price lies between F and C.
Regarding the notation, we denote the payoff upon investment, the value function, and the
investment threshold by VC , FC and P
∗
C , respectively. As we also include the derivation of the
same quantities under regulatory uncertainty, we use V
(ω)
C , F
(ω)
C , and P
∗(ω)
C to denote the payoff
upon investment, the value function, and the investment threshold when the price floor is ωF and
the price cap is ωCC. Finally, FCR and P
∗
CR denote the value function and investment threshold
under regulatory uncertainty.
The instantaneous profit function of the renewable energy project with a sliding premium is
given by:
ΠC(P ) = Min(Max(P, F ), C)Q (16)
Next, we present the results concerning the investment thresholds for both cases, namely
without and with regulatory uncertainty.
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4.1 No regulatory uncertainty
We build on the work from Adkins, Paxson, Pereira & Rodrigues (2019) in order to derive the
sliding premium and extend it in order to model a policy change before the project starts, with a
Poisson process. In the above paper, the authors provide the value of the project with a perpetual
collar contract, given by:
VCP (P ) =

E1P
β1 +
FQ
r
for P < F
G1P
β1 +G2P
β2 +
PQ
r − µ for F 6 P < C
H2P
β2 +
CQ
r
for P > C
(17)
where:
E1 =
(F 1−β1 − C1−β1)Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
< 0 (18)
G1 = −C
1−β1Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
< 0 (19)
G2 =
F 1−β2Q
β1 − β2
(
β1
r
− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
> 0 (20)
H2 =
(F 1−β2 − C1−β2)Q
β1 − β2
(
β1
r
− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
< 0 (21)
We calculate E1, G1, G2, and H2 by equating the values and derivatives because VMP (P ) must
be continuously differentiable along P . In addition, β1 is presented in (7) and β2 is:
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
((
−1
2
+
µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
) 1
2
< 0. (22)
Moving on to the finite case (T < ∞), we start by deriving the value received upon investment
(i.e, the value of the project), as defined in (4).
Proposition 1 The value of the project with a finite collar scheme is given by:
VC(P ) = VCP (P )− SC(P ) + PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (23)
where
SC(P ) = E1P
β1Φ(−dβ1(P, F )) +
FQ
r
e−rTΦ(−d0(P, F ))
+G1P
β1(Φ(dβ1(P, F ))− Φ(dβ1(P,C))) +G2P β2(Φ(dβ2(P, F ))− Φ(dβ2(P,C)))
+
PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (Φ(d1(P, F ))− Φ(d1(P,C)))
+H2P
β2Φ(dβ2(P,C)) +
CQ
r
e−rTΦ(d0(P,C)) (24)
where, in the above equations, Φ(.) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution, with
dβ(P,X) =
ln
P
X
+
(
µ+ σ2
(
β − 1
2
))
T
σ
√
T
, for β ∈ {0, 1, β1, β2}. (25)
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Proof. The value of the project with finite duration is equal to the value of the project with
perpetual collar minus the value of the project with a delayed perpetual collar (a collar that starts
in the future moment T ) plus the expected value of the total profit after the end of the subsidized
contract.
Equation (24) corresponds to the second term. For more details see the work from Adkins,
Paxson, Pereira & Rodrigues (2019).
Therefore, we can present the value of the option and the investment threshold.
Proposition 2 The value of the investment option in a project with a sliding premium is given
by:
FC(P ) =

(VC(P
∗
C)− I)
(
P
P ∗C
)β1
for P < P ∗C
VC(P )− I for P > P ∗C
(26)
where the investment threshold, P ∗C, is the numerical solution of the following equation:
β1(VC(P
∗
C)− I)−
∂VC(P
∗
C)
∂P ∗C
P ∗C = 0 (27)
This equation results in three equations that are presented in Appendix A.1. The solution of
the investment threshold P ∗C , computed using (27), can only be found using numerical methods.
Therefore, one may ask about the existence of admissible and uniqueness of these solutions. We
are not able to provide a formal proof, but we have tested a range of different values for the
parameters, such as the base-case parameters in Section 6, and we were always able to find
numerical solutions with the desired accuracy. This is also the case for the other regimes, with
and without regulatory uncertainty. Although these equations are, in general, highly non-linear,
again our tests suggest that any mathematics solver can find numerical solutions.
4.2 Regulatory uncertainty
Next, we follow similar steps to derive the investment threshold, but now for the scenario with
regulatory uncertainty. According to (11), we need to solve the following differential equation:
µ P
∂FCR(P )
∂P
+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FCR(P )
∂P 2
− rFCR(P ) + λ[J (ω)1 P β1 − FCR(P )] = 0. (28)
where J
(ω)
1 refers to the first branch of (26), which accounts for the value of the investment option
in a project with a sliding premium with cap ωcC and floor ωF . Hence:
J
(ω)
1 = (V
(ω)
C (P
∗(ω)
C )− I)
(
1
P
∗(ω)
C
)β1
(29)
where P
∗(ω)
C is the correspondent of P
∗
C , given by (27), when the price floor is ωF and the price
cap is ωCC. The general solution of (28) is K1P
η1 + J
(ω)
1 P
β1 .
Note that ω and ωC are smaller or equal to 1, consequently ωF 6 F and ωCC 6 C. We
can thus conclude that P ∗C < P
∗(ω)
C . In other words, a smaller price floor and price cap leads to
a higher investment threshold, because an investor that is still waiting to invest when the price
floor is F and the price cap is C, will certainly be waiting to invest when the price floor and the
price cap are lower (i.e., equal to ωF and ωCC).
Finally, we are able to present the value function and the investment threshold for this case.
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Proposition 3 The value of the option with a collar FIT scheme and regulatory uncertainty is
given by:
FCR(P ) =

(VC(P
∗
CR)− I − J (ω)1 P ∗CRβ1)
(
P
P ∗CR
)η1
+ J
(ω)
1 P
β1 for P < P ∗CR
VC(P )− I for P > P ∗CR
(30)
The investment threshold P ∗CR is the solution of the following equation, that must be solved nu-
merically:
η1(VC(P
∗
CR)− I − J (ω)1 P ∗CRβ1) + β1J (ω)1 P ∗CRβ1 −
∂VC(P
∗
CR)
∂P ∗CR
P ∗CR = 0 (31)
This equation results in three equations that are presented in Appendix A.1.
5 Other FITs
Using the results derived in the previous section, we show next how we can derive the value
function and investment threshold for the minimum price guarantee and the fixed-price FIT.
Since the fixed-premium FIT is not a special case of the collar regime, we present the derivations
independently at the end of this section.
In Appendix B, we present the proofs that the minimum price guarantee and the fixed-price
FIT are a special case of the sliding premium, letting C → ∞ for the minimum price guarantee
case and C = F for the fixed-price FIT case.
5.1 Minimum price guarantee FIT
A FIT with a minimum price guarantee (Barbosa, Ferra˜o, Rodrigues & Sardinha 2018) uses a
price-floor regime. In this scheme, an investor either (i) receives a fixed amount when the market
price is below the price floor, or (ii) sells energy for the market price when the market price is
above the price floor. As mentioned above, the price-floor regime is a special case of the collar
regime when C goes to ∞.
The instantaneous profit function of the renewable energy project with a minimum price
guarantee is:
ΠM(P ) = Max(P, F )Q (32)
where F is a minimum price guarantee due to a FIT contract, and Q is the quantity of energy
produced.
Following the same reasoning of the collar regime, the value of the project with a finite mini-
mum guarantee is given by:
VM(P ) = VMP (P )− SM(P ) + PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (33)
where VMP (P ) is the value of the perpetual minimum price guarantee contract, SM(P ) is the
value of the project with a delayed perpetual minimum price guarantee contract (i.e., a minimum
price guarantee contract that starts in the future moment T ), and PQ
r−µe
−(r−µ)T is the perpetual
discounted profit from selling at market prices.
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As a consequence of Proposition (1), letting C →∞, it follows that the value of the perpetual
minimum price guarantee contract, VMP , is given by:
VMP (P ) =

L1P
β1 +
FQ
r
for P < F
M2P
β2 +
PQ
r − µ for P > F
(34)
where
L1 =
QF 1−β1
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
> 0 (35)
M2 =
QF 1−β2
β1 − β2
(
β1
r
− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
> 0 (36)
with L1 is derived from (18) letting C =∞, and M2 = G2 is derived from (20). See Proposition
(12) of Appendix B.
Moreover, if in (24) we let again C =∞, and using the properties of the normal distribution,
we conclude that
SM(P ) =L1P
β1Φ(−dβ1(P, F )) +
FQ
r
e−rTΦ(−d0(P, F ))
+M2P
β2Φ(dβ2(P, F )) +
PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)TΦ(d1(P, F )) (37)
Finally, as a consequence of Proposition (2), and in view of these quantities, the next result
holds.
Proposition 4 The value of the option to invest with a minimum price guarantee design and the
investment threshold are:
FM(P ) =

(VM(P
∗
M)− I)
(
P
P ∗M
)β1
for P < P ∗M
VM(P )− I for P > P ∗M
(38)
where P ∗M is the solution of
β1(VC(P
∗
M)− I)−
∂VC(P
∗
M)
∂P ∗M
P ∗M = 0 (39)
which in this case leads to two equations presented in Appendix A.2, that need to be solved using
numerical methods.
We note that in this case the investment threshold P ∗M is the solution of one of the two
equations of (39), depending on the relative ordering of P ∗M and F . This is a direct consequence
of (32), as the instantaneous profit function depends also on the relative ordering of the price
P and the minimum price guarantee F , which impacts of the expression for the value of the
project, as shown in (34). Therefore, when one is deriving the investment threshold P ∗M , we have
two possible cases for the value matching and smoothing pasting conditions, depending on what
instance of the value of the project we are using.
In a similar way to what we have considered in the previous sections, we also consider the
case that the minimum price guarantee F can be affected by a policy change before the project
starts. As the reasoning is similar to the one presented previously, we omit further comments and
present the results for a scenario with a finite minimum price guarantee contract and regulatory
uncertainty.
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Proposition 5 The value of the option with a minimum price guarantee and regulatory uncer-
tainty is given by:6
FMR(P ) =

(VM(P
∗
MR)− I −N (ω)1 P ∗MRβ1)
(
P
P ∗MR
)η1
+N
(ω)
1 P
β1 for P < P ∗MR
VM(P )− I for P > P ∗MR
(40)
where
N
(ω)
1 =
(
V
(ω)
M
(
P
∗(ω)
M
)
− I
)( 1
P
∗(ω)
M
)β1
(41)
The investment threshold P ∗MR is the solution of the following equation, that must be solved
numerically:
η1(VM(P
∗
MR)− I −N (ω)1 P ∗MRβ1) + β1N (ω)1 P ∗MRβ1 −
∂VM(P
∗
MR)
∂P ∗MR
P ∗MR = 0 (42)
This equation results in three equations that are presented in Appendix A.2.
Given the relation between the sliding premium and the minimum price, one has the following
dominance result. The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 6 The investment threshold of the project with a sliding premium contract is always
smaller than the investment threshold of the project with a minimum price guarantee contract.
5.2 Fixed-price FIT
In this regime, the renewable energy producer has a fixed-tariff contract, where the firm receives
F for a period of time T . The fixed-price scheme is a special case of the collar regime when C
equal to F . Among all FIT designs, the fixed-price FIT is the most widely used FIT scheme
around the world. For instance, fixed-price FITs have been offered in Germany, France, Portugal,
Canada, and among other countries (Couture, Kreycik & Williams 2010).
The value of the project has a fixed-tariff contract with a finite duration T . After time T , the
renewable energy producer sells the energy for the market price P . Hence, after investment, the
firm gets the following expected value in (2):
VF (P ) = E
[∫ T
0
FQe−rtdt+
∫ +∞
T
PtQe
−rtdt
∣∣∣∣P0 = P] = FQr (1− e−rT )+ PQr − µe−(r−µ)T . (43)
In Proposition (13) of Appendix B we present a formal proof of such result, using the results from
the sliding premium.
Therefore, in view of Proposition (2), with F = C, it follows that
Proposition 7 The value of the investment option with a fixed price design is given by:7
FF (P ) =

(VF (P
∗
F )− I)
(
P
P ∗F
)β1
for P < P ∗F
VF (P )− I for P > P ∗F
(44)
where the investment threshold P ∗F is equal to:
P ∗F =
β1
(β1 − 1)
r − µ
Qe−(r−µ)T
(
I − FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )) . (45)
6The general option value function is R1P
η1 +N
(ω)
1 P
β1 .
7The general option value function is S1P
β1 .
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We note that in this case, contrary to the previous cases, we are able to find a closed expression
for the investment threshold.
If regulatory uncertainty is present, then it follows from the previous results that the value
function and investment threshold are given as follows.
Proposition 8 The value of the investment option with a fixed price scheme and regulatory un-
certainty is given by:8
FFR(P ) =

(
VF (P
∗
FR)− I − S(ω)1 P ∗FRβ1
)( P
P ∗FR
)η1
+ S
(ω)
1 P
β1 for P < P ∗FR
VF (P )− I for P > P ∗FR
(46)
where the investment threshold P ∗FR is the solution of the following equation, which needs to be
solved using numerical methods:
−(η1 − β1)S(ω)1 P ∗FRβ1 + (η1 − 1)
P ∗FRQ
r − µ e
−(r−µ)T + η1
(
FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )− I) = 0. (47)
5.3 Fixed-premium FIT
Next, we analyze a fixed-premium contract, whereby the firm receives a bonus F over the market
price. Fixed-premium FIT policies have been offered in countries such as Spain, the Czech Re-
public and the Netherlands (Couture, Kreycik & Williams 2010). In fact, Spain and the Czech
Republic let investors choose between a fixed-price FIT and a fixed-premium FIT.
For this contract, the profit function is given as follows:
ΠP (P ) = (P + F )Q (48)
where F is a premium over the electricity market price. It follows that this regime cannot be seen
as a special case of a sliding premium with cap and floor.
If the firm invests with a current price P , the firm gets the following expected value:
VP (P ) = E
[∫ T
0
(P + F )Qe−rtdt+
∫ +∞
T
PQe−rtdt
∣∣∣∣P0 = P] = PQr − µ + FQr (1− e−rT ) . (49)
Using the results in Section 3, we obtain the following value of the investment option for this type
of contract.
Proposition 9 The value of the investment option when the producer has a fixed-premium FIT
contract is given by:9
FP (P ) =

(VP (P
∗
P )− I)
(
P
P ∗P
)β1
for P < P ∗P
VP (P )− I for P > P ∗P
(50)
where the investment threshold P ∗P is given by:
P ∗P =
β1
β1 − 1
r − µ
Q
(
I − FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )) . (51)
8The general option value function is U1P
η1 + S
(ω)
1 P
β1 .
9The general option value function is V1P
β1 .
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If we consider uncertainty in the retraction of the subsidy, a straightforward application of the
results of Section 3 lead to the following.
Proposition 10 The value of the investment option with a fixed-premium FIT scheme and reg-
ulatory uncertainty is given by:10
FPR(P ) =

(
VF (P
∗
PR)− I − V (ω)1 P ∗PRβ1
)( P
P ∗PR
)η1
+ V
(ω)
1 P
β1 for P < P ∗PR
VF (P )− I for P > P ∗PR
(52)
where the investment threshold P ∗PR is the solution of the following equation, which needs to be
solved numerically.
−(η1 − β1)V (ω)1 P ∗PRβ1 + (η1 − 1)
Q
r − µP
∗
PR + η1
(
FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )− I) = 0. (53)
6 Analytical and Numerical Study
In this section, we study the influence of some parameters on the investment thresholds of the
FIT schemes addressed in this paper. In some cases, we are able to present analytical results and
corresponding plots of the thresholds; whereas in other cases, we only present the plots based
on numerical results for a given set of parameter values. For the latter case, we have performed
many other tests with other parameter values, besides the one presented in this section, and the
results are qualitatively the same.
For the numerical study, we use a typical European onshore wind farm with 25 wind turbines
(Enevoldsen & Valentine 2016), although our FIT models do not have any technology-specific
characteristics. The investment cots of each turbine is 1.5 Million Euros / MW (EWEA 2009)
and each turbine has a 2MW capacity. We also assume that the wind turbine’s capacity factor is
30%, which is a reasonable estimate according to EWEA (2009).
In order to simplify the analysis, we calculate the investment threshold for a single turbine but
the results can be easily extended for any number of turbines. We also assume that all parameters
have annualized values. For instance, a fixed-price FIT with an F equal to e 25 / MWh generates
an annual revenue of e 131,400.00 (i.e., 30 % x 2 MWh x e 25 / MWh x 24 hours x 365 days).
In addition, we use the same values of Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016) for the GBM parameters,
which are based on real data. Table 1 summarizes the base-case parameters of the numerical
study in this section. In particular for the sliding premium, we assume that the annual revenue
from the price cap is equal to e 300,000.00 (≈ e 57.08 / MWh).
Next, we present the comparative statics results for the two parameters related with regulatory
uncertainty, that we are able to derive analytically, by manipulation of the equations that define
implicitly the investment thresholds (as in the case of regulatory uncertainty, the investment
thresholds for all the regimes are defined implicitly, by some non-linear equation). The proofs are
presented in Appendix C, and are somehow simplified, as they follow from long calculations.
Proposition 11 When there is regulatory uncertainty, the investment thresholds for all the four
schemes considered in this paper decrease with λ and increase with ω.
Therefore, investment is anticipated when it is more likely to occur a reduction of the tariff,
because investors prefer to anticipate the investment decision in order to obtain a higher tariff for
a longer period. Figure 1 illustrates this behavior, for different values of the parameter λ. We also
10The general option value function is W1P
η1 + V
(ω)
1 P
β1 .
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Table 1: Base-case parameters used to calculate the thresholds
r risk-free rate 5%
F tariff e 25 / MWh
T finite duration of FIT 15 years
µ deterministic drift 0%
σ volatility 19%
I total investment cost e 3 Millions
ω the reduction of F is (1 - ω) 80%
ωC the reduction of C is (1 - ωC) 100%
λ mean arrival rate of a jump event 0.5
include the investment threshold in a free-market condition (i.e., P ∗W ),
11 where investors do not
have any FIT policies available. Note that, for the sliding premium, we do not consider changes
in the price cap (i.e., ωC = 1) due to regulatory uncertainty. We analyze the effect of regulatory
uncertainty on the price cap later in this section.
Fixed price (PFR* )
Premium (PPR* )
Price floor (PMR* )
Collar (PCR* )
Without FIT (PW* )
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
30
40
50
60
λ
P F
R* ,P
PR* ,P
M
R* ,
P C
R* ,P
W*
Figure 1: Triggers P ∗FR, P
∗
PR, P
∗
MR and P
∗
CR as a function of λ
An interesting result in Figure 1 is that increasing λ generates a higher reduction in the fixed
price and fixed premium thresholds than in the price-floor and collar thresholds. The intuition
behind this effect is due to the reduction and how it affects the four FIT policies. While the
reduction in the fixed-price and premium-price policies always leads to a revenue loss, the price-
floor and collar regimes only suffer a revenue loss when P < F .
A similar effect occurs if the reduction of the tariff is larger. Figure 2 illustrates such behavior.
The plot of the investment threshold of the collar regime assumes that the reduction only affects
the price floor. From Figure 2, we can observe that all the investment thresholds decrease as ω
decreases. This is due to the fact that lower values of ω produce higher reductions in the tariff, and
consequently a lower expected profit. These potential losses generate lower investment thresholds
because investors decide to accelerate investment in order to obtain a higher tariff before the
jump event occurs. In addition, the effect of ω is greater in the fixed-price and fixed-premium
FIT schemes, as shown in Figure 2, because of the same reason explained for the parameter λ.
11We calculate P ∗W with the threshold of the fixed-premium where the tariff F is equal to 0.
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Premium (PPR* )
Price floor (PMR* )
Collar (PCR* )
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Figure 2: Triggers P ∗FR, P
∗
PR, P
∗
MR and P
∗
CR as a function of ω
Although we assume in Figure 2 that a policy-making decision could only reduce the price
floor in the collar regime, we know that policy uncertainty may also affect the price cap. Hence,
Figures 3a and 3b present the investment threshold when a policy reduction affects the price
cap. We assume that the price cap may be reduced to ωCC when a jump event occurs with a
probability λdt. In Figure 3a, we observe that the investment threshold decreases as ωC decreases,
thus accelerating the investment decision. In addition, Figure 3b plots the investment threshold
when ω = 1 and ωC = 0.8, and we can see that the threshold reduces as λ increases. Hence, a
higher probability of occurring a reduction makes investors accelerate the decision-making process
in order to obtain a higher tariff before the jump event.
Another interesting observation occurs when we compare the collar’s threshold plot in Figure
1, where ω = 0.8 and ωC = 1, with Figure 3b, where ω = 1 and ωC = 0.8. As λ increases,
we observe that the investment threshold has a larger reduction when the policymaker reduces
the price cap, as observed in Figure 3b, than the price floor, as shown in Figure 1. In a similar
comparison, we observe a larger reduction in the investment threshold in Figure 3a, where ωC
varies in the interval [0, 1], than the reduction in the collar’s threshold plot in Figure 2, where
ω varies in the interval [0, 1]. In summary, these plots show that the price cap reduction has a
higher impact on investment threshold than the price floor reduction.
Collar (PCR* )
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
ωc
P C
R*
(a) Trigger as a function of ωC
Collar (PCR* )
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
42
43
44
45
46
47
λ
P C
R*
(b) Trigger as a function of λ
Figure 3: Trigger P ∗CR as a function of ωC and λ
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Figure 4: Thresholds P ∗FR, P
∗
PR, P
∗
MR and P
∗
CR as a function of F
Figure 4 presents the investment thresholds for the four different FIT policies as a function
of the tariff F . The plots show that the investment thresholds of the FIT policies decrease as
F increases; in other words, the decision to invest is accelerated when F increases12. In the
Appendix we find the analytical proof of such result for the fixed price and fixed premium (with
and without regulatory uncertainty).
We also observe that the thresholds for the fixed-premium regime, price-floor regime, and
collar regime are lower than the investment threshold in a free-market condition. In fact, these
are expected results for policymakers because a key goal of a price-based incentive, such as a FIT,
should be to accelerate the investment decision. The only exception is the fixed-price regime for
values of F approximately lower than e 25/MWh, where the investment threshold in a free-market
condition is below the investment threshold of the fixed-price regime. This result suggests that
investors prefer the free-market condition to a low remuneration from the fixed-price FIT. Hence,
policymakers should offer values of the tariff with a fixed-price scheme greater than this point.
In other words, this is the minimum value of the tariff that policymakers should offer within a
fixed-price FIT contract.
The plots of the investment threshold of the collar regime and price-floor regime in Figure 4
present two relevant results for policymakers. First, the price floor regime is a special case of the
collar regime as shown in Figure 5, whereby the investment threshold of the collar regime rapidly
converges to the price-floor regime as we increase the value of the cap C.13 Second, we observe
from Figure 4 that the collar threshold is below the price-floor threshold when both regimes have
the same price floor value. This result of accelerating the investment decision is due to the cap,
especially for lower values of the price floor. An explanation for this result is that investors want
to avoid receiving the cap, and hence prefer to start the investment when the market price is
lower. From a policy-making perspective, this result suggests that the collar regime is a better
policy than the price-floor regime because it accelerates the investment while avoiding excessive
earnings to producers. In addition, we analytically prove that the value of the project with a
price-floor regime is always greater than the value of the project with a collar regime in Appendix
B at Proposition 6. These are expected results because an investor should have a higher profit
without the price cap.
Figure 6 shows a plot of the investment thresholds of the collar scheme as a function of the cap
12The same result holds for a scenario without regulatory uncertainty
13In Appendix B at Proposition 12 we prove that the value of the project with a collar regime converges to a
price-floor regime when C → +∞. Consequently, the thresholds of both regimes are the same when C → +∞.
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Figure 5: Triggers P ∗MR and P
∗
CR as a function of the tariff F for different values of the cap C
C. From the figure, we can observe that the investment threshold has a minimum point where C
is approximately equal to 42. Therefore, policymakers should not offer caps above this value.
Collar (PCR* )
30 35 40 45
46
48
50
52
C
P C
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Figure 6: Threshold P ∗CR as a function of the price cap C
Figure 7 presents the plots of the investment thresholds for different values of the volatility
σ. The results are consistent with the real options theory where higher volatilities increase the
thresholds and consequently postpone the investment decision. Moreover, in the Appendix we
prove analytically such result for the fixed price and for the fixed premium regimes, with and
without regulatory uncertainty.
In Figure 8 we present the plots of the investment thresholds for different values of the dura-
tion of the contract T . The premium, floor and collar regimes presented in Figure 8a accelerate
the investment when policymakers increase the duration of the contract. However, the fixed-price
regime is different when the tariff is low, as shown in Figure 8b. For a tariff equal to e 25/MWh,
note that the fixed-price FIT duration has a non-monotonic effect: it initially accelerates invest-
ment and then it defers investment as we increase the duration of the contract. Figure 8b also
shows that this effect does not occur for higher tariffs (i.e., e 37.5/MWh and e 50/MWh) because
the investment is accelerated when the duration of the contract increases. Hence, policymakers
should not use low tariffs in the fixed-price regime because it might generate an undesired behavior
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Figure 7: Thresholds P ∗FR, P
∗
PR, P
∗
MR and P
∗
CR as a function of σ
of postponing the investment decision.
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(a) Premium, Floor and Collar regimes
Fixed price with F=25 (PFR* )
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(b) Fixed price regime for different values of F
Figure 8: Investment threshold as function of T
From the previous figures in this section, one might draw a conclusion that the fixed-premium
regime is the best FIT contract because it presents the lowest investment trigger. However, this is
a misleading conclusion because the previous plots consider that all regimes have the same tariff
value F . In particular, the fixed-premium regime considers that the remuneration is equal to the
market price plus the tariff F , which generates a higher remuneration than all the other regimes.
Figure 9 presents the values of the tariff that generate the same investment trigger. As expected,
the fixed-premium plot is below all the other plots because a policymaker should use a smaller
tariff for this regime in order to generate the same threshold as the other regimes. Figure 9 can
also be used as a tool for policy-making because it presents the values of the tariff F that generate
the same trigger for the four FIT policies.
7 Concluding remarks
This work analyzes two different feed-in premiums, namely a minimum price guarantee and a
sliding premium with cap and floor. We also include the fixed-price FIT and fixed-premium FIT
in the analysis, because these schemes have been widely analyzed within the scientific community.
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Figure 9: Feed-in tariff F as a function of the thresholds
For each scheme, we use a semi-analytical real options framework in order to calculate the value
of the project, the option value, and the optimal investment threshold. We also extend the models
of each FIT scheme in order to include regulatory uncertainty, where we use a Poisson process to
model an occasional reduction on the tariff before the project starts.
Regarding the effect of the regulatory uncertainty, the results show that a higher probability of
occurring a reduction in the tariff accelerates the investment because investors are anticipating the
investment decision in order to obtain a higher tariff. In addition, a higher probability of occurring
a policy change generates a higher reduction in the fixed-price and fixed-premium thresholds than
the thresholds of the price-floor regime and the collar regime. This effect is due to a revenue loss
that always occurs in the fixed-price and fixed-premium schemes in the event of a policy change,
while the price-floor and collar schemes only suffer a revenue loss when the market price is below
the guarantee. Regarding the analysis of the tariff reduction, we also reach the same conclusions.
Thus, a higher reduction of the tariff accelerates the investment. We also find that the effect of
the tariff reduction is greater for the fixed-price and fixed-premium thresholds than the price-floor
and collar thresholds.
This paper also presents several results for policy-making. First, the sliding premium has an
interesting property. The possibility of reducing only the cap leads to a lower threshold when
compared with the same effect on the price floor. Hence, the collar regime under the risk of
regulatory uncertainty in the price cap has a higher impact on the investment threshold than the
price floor.
Second, the thresholds of the fixed-premium regime, price-floor regime, and collar regime are
lower than the investment threshold in a free-market condition. In fact, this is an expected result,
because these policy schemes are aimed at accelerating a renewable energy investment. However,
the fixed-price regime only has a threshold below the free-market condition when the tariff is
greater than a certain value. Consequently, policymakers should avoid offering low values of the
tariff in the fixed-price regime.
Third, the results show that the collar regime has a lower investment threshold than the price-
floor regime, especially when the price floor assumes lower values. This could suggest that the
collar regime is a better policy because it accelerates investment and has the property of avoiding
excessive earnings to producers.
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Fourth, increasing the duration of the contract reduces the investment threshold of the fixed-
premium regime, price-floor regime, and collar regime. However, this effect does not occur in
the fixed-price regime if the tariff is low. Lastly, we present an interesting tool for policy-making
with our model, whereby policymakers can find the values of the tariff F that generate the same
trigger for the four FIT policies.
The current paper can be extended in several ways. From a policy-making perspective, the
welfare effects of the different FIT schemes are relevant. These include not only the budget costs
but also the effects on the consumers’ and producers’ surpluses, as well as the environmental
effects. Further research could also consider the optimal capacity choice of the renewable en-
ergy producer, following Bar-Ilan & Strange (1999) and Dangl (1999) for the monopoly case,
and Huisman & Kort (2015) for the duopoly case, and Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012) and
Chronopoulos, Hagspiel & Fleten (2016) for price-taker firms. Another interesting extension is
the possibility of retroactive reduction of the tariff (after the investment occurs). Since we deal
with finite-lived schemes, a numerical method is required to find the project value, as it becomes
time-dependent (the value of the project depends upon when the FIT is reduced).
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A Equations for finding the triggers
In this section we present the equations that need to be solved numerically to obtain the triggers
for investment for the sliding premium and minimum price guarantee FITs.
A.1 Sliding premium with cap and floor
For the case without regulatory uncertainty, Equation (27) results in following three equations:
−(β1 − β2) (G2 (Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C)))
+H2Φ(dβ2(P
∗
C , C)))P
∗
C
β2
+(β1 − 1) P
∗
CQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗C , C))))
+β1
FQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , F )))
)
−β1
(
CQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , C))) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗C < F
(β1 − β2) (G2 (1− (Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C))))
−H2Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C)))P ∗Cβ2
+(β1 − 1) P
∗
CQ
r − µ
(
1 + e−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗C , C))))
)
−β1FQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , F )))
)
−β1
(
CQ
r
e−rTΦ(d0(P ∗C , C)) + I
)
= 0 for F 6 P ∗C < C
−(β1 − β2) (G2 (Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C)))
−H2 (1− Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C))))P ∗Cβ2
+(β1 − 1) P
∗
CQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗C , F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗C , C))))
−β1FQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , F )))
+β1
(
CQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , C)))
)− I) = 0 for P ∗C > C
(54)
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For the case with regulatory uncertainty, Equation (31) results in following three equations:
(η1 − β1) (E1Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, F ))
−G1 (Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, C)))− J (ω)1
)
P ∗CR
β1
−(η1 − β2) (G2 (Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, C)))
+H2Φ(dβ2(P
∗
CR, C)))P
∗
CR
β2
+(η1 − 1)P
∗
CRQ
r − µ e
−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗CR, C))))
+η1
FQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗CR, F )))
)
−η1
(
CQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗CR, C))) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗CR < F
−(η1 − β1) (E1 (1− Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, F )))
−G1 (1− (Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, C)))) + J (ω)1
)
P ∗CR
β1
+(η1 − β2) (G2 (1− (Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, C))))
−H2Φ(dβ2(P ∗C , C)))P ∗CRβ2
+(η1 − 1)P
∗
CRQ
r − µ
(
1 + e−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗CR, C))))
)
−η1FQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗CR, F )))
)
−η1
(
CQ
r
e−rTΦ(d0(P ∗CR, C)) + I
)
= 0 for F 6 P ∗CR < C
−(η1 − β1) (E1Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, F ))
+G1 (Φ(dβ1(P
∗
CR, F ))− Φ(dβ1(P ∗CR, C))) + J (ω)1
)
P ∗CR
β1
+(η1 − β2) (G2 (Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, C)))
−H2 (1− Φ(dβ2(P ∗CR, C))))P ∗CRβ2
+(η1 − 1)P
∗
CRQ
r − µ e
−(r−µ)T (1− (Φ(d1(P ∗CR, F ))− Φ(d1(P ∗CR, C))))
−η1FQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗C , F )))
+η1
(
CQ
r
(
1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗CR, C)))
)− I) = 0 for P ∗CR > C
(55)
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A.2 Minimum price guarantee
For the case without regulatory uncertainty, Equation (39) results in the following two equations:
−(β1 − β2)M2P ∗Mβ2Φ(dβ2(P ∗M , F ))
+(β1 − 1)P
∗
MQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (1− Φ(d1(P ∗M , F )))
+β1
(
FQ
r
(1− e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗M , F ))))− I
)
= 0 for P ∗M < F
(β1 − β2)M2P ∗Mβ2(1− Φ(dβ2(P ∗M ,F )))
+(β1 − 1)P
∗
MQ
r − µ
(
1 + e−(r−µ)T (1− Φ(d1(P ∗M , F )))
)
−β1
(
FQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0(P ∗M , F ))) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗M > F
(56)
For the case with regulatory uncertainty, Equation (42) results in the following two equations:

(η1 − β1)(L1Φ(dβ1)−N (ω)1 )P ∗MRβ1 − (η1 − β2)M2P ∗MRβ2Φ(dβ2)
+η1
(
FQ
r
− FQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0))− I
)
+(η1 − 1)P
∗
MRQ
r − µ e
−(r−µ)T (1− Φ(d1)) = 0 for P ∗MR < F
−(η1 − β1)(L1(1− Φ(dβ1)) +N (ω)1 )P ∗MRβ1 + (η1 − β2)M2P ∗MRβ2(1− Φ(dβ2))
+(η1 − 1)P
∗
MRQ
r − µ (1− e
−(r−µ)TΦ(d1)
+e−(r−µ)T )− η1
(
FQ
r
e−rT (1− Φ(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗MR > F
(57)
B Proofs of relations between investment thresholds
Proposition 12 The investment threshold of a project with perpetual sliding premium is equal to
the investment threshold with a perpetual minimum price guarantee when the price cap C → +∞.
Proof: We first calculate the limit of the value of the project with a perpetual sliding premium
(i.e., Equation (17)) when the price cap C → +∞.
As (17) depends on E1, G1, G2 and H2, we calculate the limit for each of these variables. In
addition, it is easy to see that when C → +∞, the third region (i.e: when P > C) disappears.
Hence, we do not calculate the limit of H2 because it appears only in the third region
14.
lim
C→+∞
E1 =
F 1−β1Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
= L1 (58)
lim
C→+∞
G1 = 0 (59)
lim
C→+∞
G2 = G2 = M2 (60)
14Recall that G2 is equal to M2.
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Hence, the value of the project with a perpetual sliding premium when the price cap C → +∞
is:
VCP (P ) =

L1P
β1 +
FQ
r
for P < F
M2P
β2 +
PQ
r − µ for P > F
= VMP (P ) (61)
We demonstrate that when C → +∞, the value of the project with a perpetual sliding premium
is equal to the value of the project with a perpetual minimum price guarantee. Therefore, it is
easy to see that when C → +∞, the optimal threshold of the project with a perpetual sliding
premium is also equal to the optimal threshold of the project with a minimum price guarantee
contract for the same sunk cost I.
Proposition 13 The investment threshold of a project with perpetual sliding premium is equal to
the investment threshold with fixed price scheme when the price floor F is equal to the price cap
C.
Proof: We first calculate the value of the project with a perpetual sliding premium (i.e.,
Equation (17) when the price cap C is equal to the price floor F .
As (17) depends on E1, G1, G2 and H2, we first calculate the value of these variables when
C = F . It is easy to see that E1 and H2 are equal to 0, hence the first and third regions (i.e:
when P < F and P > C) are equal FQ
r
. In addition, substituting F for P and C in the second
region also yields to FQ
r
. Consequently, when C = F , VCP (P ) =
FQ
r
Next, as Φ(−dβ(P,X)) = 1− Φ(dβ(P,X)), substituting F for P and C in (24) yields:
SC(P ) =
FQ
r
e−rT (62)
Therefore, substituting FQ
r
e−rT for SC(P ) and
FQ
r
for VCP (P ) in (23) (i.e.: the value of the
project with a finite collar scheme) yields:
VC(P ) =
FQ
r
− FQ
r
e−rT +
PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T =
FQ
r
(1− e−rT ) + PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T (63)
In conclusion, the value of the project with a finite collar scheme in (23) (i.e.: when C = F )
is equal to (43) (i.e.: the expected value of the project when there is a fixed price scheme). Thus,
it is straightforward to see that the investment trigger of the project with a finite collar scheme
is equal to the investment trigger of the project when there is a fixed price scheme.
Proof of Proposition 6: In order to prove the result, we first prove that VMP (P ) > VCP (P )
for any choice of the parameters, i.e., we prove first that the value of the project with a minimum
price guarantee contract is always greater than the value of the project with sliding premium
contract, assuming both projects have the same value of the price floor.
We need to distinguish the following cases, depending on the relation between the price P ,
the minimum price F and the price cap C, as the functions take different forms in each case.
• For P < F : in order to prove the result, we just need to prove that L1 > E1. This holds as
re-writing E1 yields:
E1 =
(F 1−β1 − C1−β1)Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
= −C
1−β1Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
+ L1 (64)
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As µ < r, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0, it is easy to see that L1 is greater than E1, because β2µ−r < 0.
Therefore, when P < F , the value of the project with a minimum price guarantee contract
is greater than the value of the project with a sliding premium contract.
• For F 6 P < C: we prove that M2P β2 > G1P β1 +G2P β2 .
Re-writing G1 yields:
G1 = −C
1−β1Q
β1 − β2
(
β2
r
− β2 − 1
r − µ
)
< 0 (65)
as µ < r, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0. Therefore the result follows, as G2 = M2.
• For P > C: it holds that M2P β2 +
PQ
r − µ > H2P
β2 +
CQ
r
, as re-writing H2 yields:
H2 =
(F 1−β2 − C1−β2)Q
β1 − β2
(
β1
r
− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
= −C
1−β2Q
β1 − β2
(
β1
r
− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
+M2 (66)
It is easy to see that β1µ−r 6 0, because of the quadratic equation 1
2
σ2β(β−1)+βµ−r = 0.
As β1 > 1, the term β1µ− r is negative. Hence, H2 6 M2. In addition, as P > C because
this is the third branch, it is straight forward to see that
PQ
r − µ >
CQ
r
.
It is straight forward to see that the value of the project with a finite minimum price guarantee
contract (i.e.: Equation (33)) is also greater than the value of the project with a finite sliding
premium contract (i.e.: Equation (23)). In other words, VMP (P ) − SM(P ) + PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T >
VCP (P )−SC(P ) + PQ
r − µe
−(r−µ)T , which implies, in its turn, that SM(P ) > SC(P ) which, in each
case, represents the value of the project with a delayed perpetual feed-in tariff contract. However,
the difference between VM and VC is greater than the difference between SM and SC , because
the former also has revenue before time T and the latter only starts to have cash flow after T .
In conclusion, the value of the project with a finite minimum price guarantee contract is always
greater than the value of the project with a finite sliding premium contract.
C Proofs for the comparative statistics
In this appendix we present the proof of Proposition 11 regarding the comparative statics on the
effect of λ and ω grouped by FIT scheme. The proofs are presented briefly, as they follow from
long calculations, starting with the simplest cases.
C.1 Fixed-premium FIT
The partial derivatives of the investment threshold is found deriving Equation (53). Let us denote
it by EP .
The partial derivative of P ∗PR to a parameter z, given that EP and P
∗
PR are both a function of
z, is:
∂P ∗PR
∂z
= −
∂EP
∂z
∂EP
∂P ∗PR
(67)
∂EP
∂P ∗PR
=
(
−β1(η1 − β1)V (ω)1 P ∗PRβ1 + (η1 − 1)
P ∗PRQ
r − µ
)
1
P ∗PR
(68)
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From the smooth-pasting condition used to obtain Equation (53) we know that
β1V
(ω)
1 P
∗
PR
β1 =
P ∗PRQ
r − µ − η1W1P
∗
PR
η1 , (69)
which allows us to obtain:
∂EP
∂P ∗PR
=
(
(η1 − β1)η1W1P ∗PRη1 + (β1 − 1)
P ∗PRQ
r − µ
)
1
P ∗PR
> 0. (70)
Since W1 > 0, η1 > β1 > 1, this partial derivative is always positive. Therefore, the sign of
the partial derivative of the threshold to z is the opposite of the sign of ∂EP
∂z
. It can be shown
that these partial derivatives are:
∂EP
∂λ
= −W1P ∗PRβ1
∂η1
∂λ
> 0 (71)
∂EP
∂ω
= −(η1 − β1)∂V
(ω)
1
∂ω
P ∗PR
β1
= −(η1 − β1)FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )( P ∗PR
P ∗P
(ω)
)β1
< 0 (72)
The signs are obtained knowing that ∂η1
∂λ
< 0, η1 > β1 > 1, P
∗
PR 6 P ∗P (ω).
C.2 Fixed-price FIT
Similarly to the previous section, the partial derivatives of the investment threshold is found
deriving Equation (47). Denoting it by EF and showing that
∂EP
∂P ∗PR
=
(
(η1 − β1)η1U1P ∗PRη1 + (β1 − 1)
Q
r − µP
∗
PR
)
1
P ∗PR
> 0, (73)
the sign of the partial derivative of the threshold to z is the opposite of the sign of ∂EP
∂z
. It can
be shown that these partial derivatives are:
∂EF
∂λ
= −U1P ∗FRβ1
∂η1
∂λ
> 0 (74)
∂EF
∂ω
= −(η1 − β1)∂S
(ω)
1
∂ω
P ∗FR
β1
= −(η1 − β1)FQ
r
(
1− e−rT )( P ∗FR
P ∗F
(ω)
)β1
< 0 (75)
The signs are obtained knowing additionally that U1 > 0,
∂η1
∂λ
< 0, η1 > β1 > 1, P
∗
FR 6 P ∗F (ω).
C.3 Minimum price guarantee
Similarly to the previous sections, the partial derivatives of the investment threshold is found
deriving the two equations in (56). Denoting them by EM and showing that
∂EM
∂P ∗PR
=
1
P ∗MR

η1(η1 − β1)R1P ∗MRη1 − β2(β1 − β2)M2P ∗MRβ2N(dβ2)
+(β1 − 1)P
∗
MRQ
r − µ e
−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) > 0 for P ∗MR < F
η1(η1 − β1)R1P ∗MRη1
−β2((η1 − β1) + (η1 − β2))M2P ∗MRβ2(N(dβ2)− 1)
+(β1 − 1)P
∗
MRQ
r − µ (1 + e
−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1))) > 0 for P ∗MR > F
(76)
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the sign of the partial derivative of the threshold to z is the opposite of the sign of ∂EM
∂z
. It can
be shown that these partial derivatives are:
∂EM
∂λ
= −R1P ∗MRβ1
∂η1
∂λ
> 0 (77)
∂EM
∂ω
= −(η1 − β1)∂N
(ω)
1
∂ω
P ∗MR
β1
= −(η1 − β1) 1
ω
(
I − (β1 − 1)N (ω)1 P ∗M (ω)
β1
)( P ∗MR
P ∗M
(ω)
)β1
< 0 (78)
The signs are obtained knowing that ∂η1
∂λ
< 0, η1 > β1 > 1, P
∗
MR 6 P ∗M (ω) 6 P ∗M < P ∗W ,
0 < R1 6 N (ω)1 6 H1 < A1W , and
(β1 − 1)N (ω)1 P ∗M (ω)
β1
< (β1 − 1)H1P ∗Mβ1 < (β1 − 1)A1WP ∗Mβ1 = (β1 − 1)
I
β1 − 1
(
P ∗M
P ∗W
)β1
< I.
C.4 Sliding premium with cap and floor
The partial derivatives of the investment threshold is found deriving the three Equations that
result from (27) and that are presented in Equation (54) in Appendix A.1. Let us denote these
equations as EC .
As for the previous cases, it can be shown that ∂EC
∂P ∗CR
> 0. Therefore, the sign of the partial
derivative of the threshold to z is the opposite of the sign of ∂EC
∂z
. It can be shown that these
partial derivatives are:
∂EC
∂λ
= −K1P ∗MRβ1
∂η1
∂λ
> 0 (79)
∂EC
∂ω
= −(η1 − β1)∂J
(ω)
1
∂ω
P ∗MR
β1
= −(η1 − β1) 1
ω
(
I − (β1 − 1)J (ω)1 P ∗C (ω)
β1
+ f
)( P ∗CR
P ∗C
(ω)
)β1
< 0 (80)
where
f =

(β1 − 1)G(ω)1 Φ(dβ1(P ∗C (ω), F ))
−(β2 − 1)
(
H
(ω)
2 −G(ω)2
)
Φ(dβ2(P
∗
C
(ω), C))
+
ωcCQ
r
e−rTΦ(d0(P ∗C , C)) for P
∗
C
(ω), F ) < C
−(β1 − 1)G(ω)1
(
1− Φ(dβ1(P ∗C (ω), F ))
)
+(β2 − 1)
(
H
(ω)
2 −G(ω)2
)(
1− Φ(dβ2(P ∗C (ω), C))
)
−ωcCQ
r
(
1− e−rTΦ(d0(P ∗C , C))
)
for P ∗C
(ω), F ) > C
(81)
The signs are obtained knowing that ∂η1
∂λ
< 0, η1 > β1 > 1, P
∗
CR 6 P ∗C (ω), and
I − (β1 − 1)J (ω)1 P ∗C (ω)
β1
+ f > 0.
The sign of this equation in proved by deriving the value of option to invest in a sliding
premium FIT without the floor (a cap FIT), denoted by Z
(ω)
1 P
β
1 (for instance taking C to the
limit of 0). It can be shown that f > (β1 − 1)Z(ω)1 P ∗C (ω)
β1 − I and Z(ω)1 > J (ω)1 .
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